ABSTRACT. This article explores commonalities between parental claims for lesbian co-mothers and other contexts in which intention is a key aspect to family formation for (mostly) heterosexual families: in particular, surrogacy and pre-birth disputes over embryos. Through a series of case studies drawn from recent reproductive controversies, the paper uses the lens of empathy to argue for social or nongenetic modes of parenthood connecting lesbian mothers and other 'reproductive outsiders'.
Introduction
While many scholars have analysed the legal status of heterosexual families formed through assisted reproduction, and others have argued for reforms to specifically recognise lesbian-led families, there is relatively little engagement across and between these areas of research (see Bender 2006; Storrow 2002 for exceptions) . This article explores commonalities between claims to parenthood that are not based on genetic connection, examining resonances between the position of lesbian mothers and other contexts in which intention is key to family formation for (mostly) heterosexual families; in particular surrogacy and pre-birth disputes over embryos.
Lesbian co-mothers are in a situation which parallels that of infertile men who have children through assisted reproductive technology (ART) in the sense that both have children whom they intend to raise and care for but to whom they are biologically unrelated. 2 Previously I have argued that lesbian co-mothers should be accorded full parental status in law (Millbank 2008b; Millbank 2003 ) using a model that approximately reflects laws in many jurisdictions granting parental status to nonbiological parents in heterosexual families formed through the use of donor gametes (based on consent to the use of an assisted conception process). 3 Also common to both lesbian and heterosexual parents, if using in vitro fertilisation processes (IVF), is an experience of conception that is prolonged over months or even years -and thus increases opportunities for changes of mind and misunderstandings. There are also less tangible parallels between lesbian co-parents and fathers in their emotionally involved but physically distant relation to the gestation and birth process.
The commonalities between heterosexual families formed through surrogacy arrangements and lesbian-led families are not initially obvious. Surrogate families involve commissioning parents and a gestational mother; usually the commissioning father is also a genetic parent, less commonly the commissioning mother is also (if, for example, she has viable eggs but cannot sustain a pregnancy). While in some arrangements the gestational mother is also the genetic mother, donor eggs may be used if the commissioning mother is unable to contribute her own eggs, in which case four adults share the roles of genetic, gestational and social parents in a conception process that necessitates the use of IVF. Lesbian-led families are generally formed with the use of donor sperm. While the choice of anonymous donor or known donor may be dependent upon the accessibility of fertility services, it seems that many lesbians prefer to conceive in informal circumstances with an identifiable donor (who is not generally seen as a parent but will often have a family-friend or avuncular relationship, see eg. Donovan 2000; Almack 2006 ). Thus they, too, involve another adult in their reproductive endeavour who may at some stage assert a claim to parenthood.
Progressive and critical scholars who support recognition of lesbian and gay family forms may baulk at comparisons with surrogacy. The practice of surrogacy has been subject to acerbic feminist criticism, particularly in the United States (US), for commodifying women's reproductive labour and reinforcing a multitude of structural power imbalances (see eg. Rothman 1992 ). Yet there are strong thematic and legal resonances across lesbian parenting and surrogacy that deserve serious consideration.
Surrogacy represents the outer edge of non-nuclear or non-autonomous reproduction for heterosexual families. Regardless of the economic power of commissioning parents, they are disempowered in the sense that they have struggled to form a family and have had to resort to (some would say, extremely) non-normative means to do so.
Surrogate parents are placed in the position of lesbian families in that they need the involvement of another adult in order to conceive, they may face legal sanctions or disincentives in this process, they will often have one member of the couple who is not genetically related to their child and they are at the mercy of fertility services which may refuse to treat them. Moreover, if successful, the intended family form (and actual family function) achieved through surrogacy is generally unrecognised by law (Stuhmcke 2004; Seymour & Magri 2004) . In short, heterosexual commissioning parents can be seen as reproductive 'outsiders' in some ways similar to lesbian families. 4 Part I of the article sets out the context in which these issues are being raised, noting the rise of three distinct socio-legal trends: the creation of legal rights for samesex couples and parents; the increasing influence of 'fathers' rights' movements in family law; and the rise of genetic essentialism. The complex and contradictory interrelation of these trends is explored through an initial case study of two Canadian cases concerning the naming of parents on children's birth certificates. In Parts II and III of the article, resonances between the positions of non-genetic families are explored through a series of case studies drawn from recent controversies in assisted reproduction involving heterosexual couples concerning disputes over embryo use in the UK and a surrogacy arrangement in Australia. These cases raise the central difficulty of deciding who parents are when genetics are de-centred but intention is confounded by deceit or a change of mind.
In analysing these cases in Parts II and III, I engage openly with feelings of empathy and with the idea of empathy. Empathy is "a form of understanding" (Henderson 1987 (Henderson , 1576 which illuminates the situation of another and makes it intelligible; as such it is also a means of acquiring knowledge (D'Arms 2000 (D'Arms , 1469 .
Recognising what you feel, and for whom you feel, in any given controversy is an important moment in the creation or interpretation of legal rules. Empathy, like legal reasoning itself, extends by analogy and can inform attempts to craft a legal regime respectful of diversity and able to recognise a broad range of family forms. I argue that empathy is a way of taking into account different experiences, perspectives and subject positions in the face of often highly abstracted legal argument, and of exploring and understanding important commonalities among otherwise heterogeneous 'reproductive outsiders'. Ultimately, I conclude that empathy is an interpretative tool that helps us to look behind singular moments of 'consent' in disputes to examine underlying legal and social structures that may deeply constrain parties' reproductive opportunities.
This does not mean that every -or any -feeling of empathy necessarily provides the 'right' answer in any of the cases discussed below. Rather, acknowledging and exploring feelings of empathy are an important part of interpretative inquiry because they draw attention to what we value, and hopefully help us to understand why this is so (see in particular Nussbaum 2001, although she prefers "compassion" to "empathy"). At the outset I acknowledge two quintessential 'values' informing my approach: first, a refusal to prioritise genetic relationships and, second, the validation of non-biological parenting relationships as an important and 'natural' part of many non-traditional family forms. 5
Fathers' Rights and the Rise of the Genetic Family: Who's your Bedfellow Now?
The growth in families formed through ART has taken place against a backdrop of other social developments, including increasing diversity in family forms through the growth of single-parent households and fragmentation of biological families through 5 Julie Shapiro has written that, "Challenging the primacy of the biological link as the defining factor in parenthood was a necessary step in order for lesbians to raise children within their own families". Both co-mother recognition and the non-inclusion of sperm donors as fathers in lesbian-led families "required, and continues to require the denial of parental rights based purely on genetics" (Shapiro 2006, 598-599 fathers' rights claims vigorously promote the disciplining or normative role of law to keep families together, and argue for traditional gender roles as a key aspect to maintenance of the hetero-nuclear family as the foundational social institution (see Boyd 2006) . In the bluntest possible contrast, lesbian mothers seek the creation and legal recognition of fatherless families, while fathers' rights advocates valorise fathers' roles as eternal and irreplaceable. Yet in legal terms, these otherwise starkly oppositional trends of same-sex recognition and fathers' rights are not entirely dissimilar. To borrow Helen Rhoades' term, both groups "yearn" for law (Rhoades 2006) , focussing enormous efforts on legislative change as a path to social reform and adhering closely, even devotedly, to formal equality jurisprudence and discourse to ground their claims to "equal" treatment (Young & Boyd 2006 ). In a brief judgment, lacking any contextual or substantive analysis of inequality, 8 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the "arbitrary" exclusion of Trociuk's "participation" in the register and naming of the children was unlawful sex discrimination (Lessard 2004 8 For example, the patriarchal custom of children bearing men's names is unexamined. Moreover, the historical disadvantage faced by women in relation to their children's names is entirely reversed in the judgment which refers to this simply as gender-neutral evidence of the "significance of choosing a surname": Trociuk v British Columbia [2003] 1 SCR 835, para 18. significant mode of participation in the life of a child". 9 As Shelley Gavigan argues, "It is almost impossible to imagine a more formal, less substantive, notion of 'participation in a child's life '" (2006, 324) . Both Gavigan and Hester Lessard have argued that Trociuk privileges biological parenthood over social parenting and reinscribes patriarchal power relations (Gavigan 2006, 321-325; Lessard 2004) . It is likely that Trociuk would prevent lesbian families in many Canadian provinces from excluding a known sperm donor from the birth registry if he wanted to be named on it, potentially both denying co-mother recognition and imposing a legal father onto a lesbian-led family. 10 It is therefore somewhat unnerving to see the lesbian social parents in Rutherford frame their claim using the language of Trociuk. 11 The abstract nature of precedent and language of formal equality make Trociuk and Rutherford look 'alike'. Vital differences in the respective social and legal power positions of 'parents' are elided in the judgments such that they appear as if natural progressions in a series of cases regarding children's birth certificates. While Darell Trociuk argued for the equal treatment of biological mothers and fathers regardless of any shared intention or care of children, the mothers in Rutherford argued for the equal treatment of non-biological mothers with non-biological fathers procreating in joint endeavours with biological mothers. The 9 Ibid para 17 (emphasis added); see also para 16 on birth registration as "an important means of participating in the life of a child", and para 19 characterising both as "meaningful participation in a child's life". 10 A donor named on the birth registry would not only take the place of a co-mother being named but could also then oppose second-parent adoption by her. lesbian mothers can more genuinely be characterised as seeking to 'participate' rather than 'control' the child's name. 12 It is worth belabouring the point that the pre-existing power positions of biological fathers and lesbian co-mothers could not be more different. As Jocelyn Elise
Crowley points out, similarities in the use of equality discourse may be extremely deceptive as, while marginalised groups (such as lesbians and gay men) are "fighting for power that they never held", fathers' rights advocates are "demanding change from a position of already deeply-held power across multiple social domains" (Crowley 2006, 99, emphasis in original) . Like Reni Ernst, the mothers in Rutherford were raising children in 'fatherless' or female-headed households in which actual caregiving replaced genetics as the most important basis of connection. While genetics and not caregiving is the core of fathers' rights' claims, for lesbian co-mothers it is the reverse, begging the question of how they came to be bedfellows here.
This contrast highlights a third cultural trend, which undergirds fathers' rights movements while undermining those of same-sex families: the rising notion of 'genetic truth' and its relationship to familial ideology (see eg. Dolgin 2000) . Fathers' rights movements have been very successful in the past decade in drawing on both discourses of 'involved' or 'new' fatherhood and of genetic truth to implement fathers' rights claims into mainstream family law (see eg. Rhoades 2006; Smart 2006; Diduck 2007) . A cultural preoccupation with genetic information has been translated into a child's right to know the 'truth' of their genetic origins (Donovan 2006) . This has in turn been transformed from simply identifying progenitors into an increasingly 12 One study suggests that, like Reni Ernst, many lesbian mothers see naming as primarily the responsibility of the birth mother (even if the name given is that of the co-mother or a hyphenated name) (Almack 2005) .
unquestioned assumption in the family law context of benefit to children from an ongoing relationship with (even previously unknown) genetic relatives. In this context 'genetic truth' may well be a stick that is increasingly used to 'beat' both lesbian mothers and heterosexual families formed with the use of donor gametes.
Intended Parents and Pre-Conception Break-Ups: The Unruly Embryo Cases One case that provokes consideration of the connection between lesbian co-mothers and heterosexual fathers most keenly is Re R in the United Kingdom (UK). 13 That dispute concerned an unmarried heterosexual couple who had sought fertility treatment initially because the man, Mr B, was infertile due to earlier treatment for testicular cancer. It became clear at some time that there was also 'a further organic reason' that the woman, Ms D, had difficulty in conceiving. Ms D underwent IVF with Mr B's support and embryos were created with the use of anonymous donor sperm.
The first cycle was unsuccessful. When Ms D undertook a second transfer cycle using a stored embryo the following year, the couple had broken up, but she did not alert the hospital to this fact nor did she tell Mr B that she was continuing with treatment. This cycle was successful and after the child's birth, Mr B sought a declaration of parental responsibility and contact with the child, both of which were opposed by the mother.
Although both the mother and the separate representative for the child initially agreed that Mr B was a legal father, 14 this was subsequently doubted by the Court of Appeal which returned the question for reconsideration. 15 Hedley J, like many of the other judges in the cases under discussion, distrusts 'sympathy' as an emotion that merely confuses the reasoned process of statutory construction. Empathy and sympathy are related but distinct emotions, which are often referred to as though they are inter-changeable. While empathy is more akin to identification or fellow-feeling, sympathy is more closely connected to feelings of pity and as such can be a distancing or 'third-personal' feeling in a way that empathy is not (see D 'Arms 2000 'Arms , 1477 'Arms -1479 Henderson 1987 Henderson , 1579 Henderson -1581 . In this instance I would argue that, despite the use of the word 'sympathy', Hedley's judgment is more suggestive of an empathic response to Mr B's position.
On first reading the Re R cases, I empathised with Mr B, but for rather different reasons than those apparent in the judgment. Unlike Hedley J, my concern was not that the child R would be 'deprived' of a father, or that ART could promote fatherlessness in general. 19 B and D v R [2002] 2 FLR 843 para 9. Indeed, the potential of ART to produce 'fatherless' children for lesbian families is regarded as a benefit in my analysis.
resembling that of a lesbian co-mother; his case rested on an intention to parent and participation in a joint enterprise to conceive a child rather than any genetic link. Sally Sheldon has expressed Mr B's claim as one of "emotional investment" in R (Sheldon 2005a, 356) . Carol Smart has classically noted the difference between men caring "about" children while women care "for" them (Smart 1991; Smart 1995) , and here Mr B's claim appears to fall squarely in the "about" camp -as he has not at any stage lived with or looked after the child (indeed through the years of litigation he had not yet met her). In this sense Smart characterises Mr B's position as akin to many traditional 'fathers' rights' claims, in which men assert the (equal) right to begin caring for children upon separation regardless of whether they provided any care prior to it (Smart 2006, 135) . Yet, unlike a traditional fathers' rights claim, Mr B was not demanding "equality" with the mother, or a relationship with the child based on the perceived importance of an enduring genetic tie. In an interview quoted by Sheldon, Mr B claimed that he did not think of himself as "a champion of fathers' rights" nor had he ever been "part of a legal crusade" (Chrisafis 2001; Sheldon 2005a, 356) .
Eschewing "rights talk" for "care talk" (Smart 2006 ), Mr B added, "I have simply loved
[R] from the moment I heard she was born" (quoted in Sheldon 2005a, 356 ).
In the same interview, Mr B referred at length to the fact that the sperm donor was selected based on similarity to his own physical characteristics, 20 a point also briefly touched on in Hedley J's judgment. 21 Smart wonders at how this potential physical resemblance strengthens the man's claim to fatherhood (2006, 129) , and it is possible to read his claim as simply reinscribing a simulacrum of the genetic tie.
However, I recall that in numerous cases involving lesbian co-mothers they too assert their involvement in the process of selecting the sperm donor for their children, and frequently note that donors are chosen for characteristics similar to themselves, without the intention of 'passing' the children as their own genetic off-spring. It is perhaps possible to read the importance that parties have placed on the choice of donor in a different way, then, as evidence of their intention to jointly parent and as a manifestation of their uniquely non-biological conception process -a process in which they spent months or years imagining the child they were to have (see Parental status for unmarried couples does not rest on consent; "no doubt", riposted Lord Hope, "because it was too simple". 23 Instead the provisions refer to the couple being treated "together". 24 Because Mr B was not being treated "together" with Ms D at the time of the embryo transfer he is not a father under UK law.
If one centred intentionality, the question to ask instead might be: having consented to the conception enterprise as a whole is there any evidence of Mr B's refusal of consent in this specific instance? In that case it is quite likely that Mr B would be found to be the legal father of R. 25 However, such an approach would also impose legal parenthood upon a deceived Mr B even if he did not wish it -for example, if the mother intended, in Hale LJ's words, to "extract child support" from parenthood. 29 This is mirrored in a number of statements from other judgments in Re. R, in which the relationships involved are characterised as destabilising, fictional or abnormal and for these reasons potentially harmful to the child. 30 Yet if we believe that non-marital families and non-genetic parenting relationships are both commonplace and socially acceptable, one's sympathies -if let loose -may lead one to be rather less concerned to limit recognition of parenthood. 31 This generates other questions about Ms D, in particular why she lied to the hospital and why she withheld the information that she was undergoing treatment from Mr B. These facts are not 'just' facts: they arise in the context of UK legislation on fertility treatment which is prescriptive in nature and discriminatory in application.
The Act provides that "a woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father)." 33 Until 2001 this provision was interpreted by most providers to exclude single women and lesbians from fertility treatment altogether. 34 Even though increasing numbers of lesbians and single women have accessed fertility services in the UK in recent years as the legislation has been interpreted more liberally, 35 they may still be lawfully excluded by any provider, and remain far less likely to be accepted into publicly funded services than heterosexual couples. 36 If Ms D had told the hospital her relationship with Mr B had broken down they would have stopped treatment and required her to go through a new round of counselling and assessment. 37 Even if Mr B had been able to vary the terms of his consent 38 and had consented to D's use of the embryo, treatment could have been refused because of the clinic's interpretation of the potential child's 'need' for a father.
The most likely course is that Ms D would have had to apply for permission to undergo another full cycle of IVF to generate embryos with her new partner. Given that this was 34 Almack 2005 at 4 notes a 2001 survey of UK clinics by a same-sex parents group which found that only 25% of clinics reported that they accepted lesbian clients. a new relationship, they may not have been approved. Even if treatment was approved it would have entailed invasive medical treatment and lengthy delays. The National Health Service (NHS) only covers the full cost of between one and three cycles of IVF for women under 40, 39 with a waiting list for treatment (depending on region) that may be years long, and indeed is longer if donor sperm is required. 40 The case reports reveal that Ms D and Mr B were first referred to the clinic in 1992, they waited two years before seeing a specialist, and then waited a further two years from the time of seeing the specialist (during which time they undertook three counselling sessions) before approval for treatment was finally granted. There was then a further delay of almost a year before treatment actually commenced in 1998. Looked at in another way, if the health system was better resourced or more efficient, R could have been an invasive full cycle of IVF, I feel rather more understanding of D's decision to lie in using 'her' embryo than on first reading the judgments.
I notice that I shifted here from referring to the embryo that created R as 'his' embryo to labelling it 'her' embryo. In the first draft this was an unconscious shift, and in edits I then changed it to 'the' or 'their' embryo in an attempt to signal neutrality. However, this is not necessarily so, as the conclusion of inconsistency presumes that consent to conception attempts and consent to legal parenthood are inextricably intertwined. Yet it is possible to frame rules about the use of gametes and the parentage of children that differ, reflecting the fact that adults may have very different relationships with gametes, embryos and foetuses than with children. It is difficult but not impossible to contend that if men in IVF conception endeavours withdraw their consent after the creation of embryos the effect should be that they are not a parent in law rather than granting an absolute or inevitable veto over use of the embryo. This should not be a specific exception for Mr B because he is a non-genetic parent, but a more general rule premised on the far greater physical toll faced by women undergoing IVF and the (usually) more limited reproductive opportunities available to them. I would apply the same principles of consent to men who do have a genetic connection to the embryo as well as those who don't, and to lesbian co-mothers as well. Empathy, then, need not lead to paralysis; it may instead draw us away from the binary positions that adversarial decision-making engenders and open up a more complex series of considerations and potential outcomes.
The case brought by Natalie Evans, culminating in an appeal in 2007 to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights raises an extreme example of a male partner's 'veto' power in IVF which brought forth strong emotional reactions in both the public and the judiciary. 41 In that case Natalie Evans was diagnosed with slow-growing ovarian tumours and advised that she could undergo one cycle of egg harvesting prior to surgery to remove her ovaries and fallopian tubes, which would allow her to undertake IVF later in life. Unlike the unmarried couple in Re R, Evans and her partner, Howard Johnston, were rushed through assessment and treatment because of her illness: she was told of her diagnosis, counselled and had signed the consent forms for fertility treatment in the space of an hour. 42 Evans asked if her eggs could be frozen without first fertilising them with Johnston's sperm (a highly experimental treatment at that time) and was told that the clinic was only able to freeze embryos not eggs. Johnston urged Evans "not to be negative", reassured her that he wanted to have children with her, and the couple signed consents to be treated together. 43 The procedure went ahead some weeks later in which six embryos using the gametes of both partners were ultimately created and frozen. Evans and Johnston broke up six months later and two months after the break-up Johnston informed the clinic of this fact, indicating that he wished the embryos to be destroyed. Evans As in the case of Re R, the discriminatory child 'welfare' provision in UK legislation and practice has a lot to answer for in Evans (Sheldon 2004) . Clinic staff attested that if Ms Evans had insisted on pursuing fertility options that did not leave her dependent on Mr Johnston's participation and consent (and given the ultimate outcome of the case, one must say, control) then they would probably not have treated 43 Id para 58. 44 Evans was joined in the first case by Lorraine Hadley, whose husband had also withdrawn consent to the use of their embryos upon their relationship breakdown. Hadley did not appeal. her at all, based on their "perception of the suitability and appropriateness of IVF treatment for the couple since the welfare of any potential child or children from such treatment is always our paramount concern". 48 In a non-discriminatory program Evans could have had some or all of her eggs fertilised with donor sperm (or even frozen unfertilised, although it was at that stage a highly experimental procedure 49 ), to hedge her bets as it were. However in the UK regime as it then stood these options would not only have been refused but likely led to a denial of treatment altogether.
While there is not scope in this article to explore all of the arguments made by Evans, the lack of judicial attention to the relationship between the discriminatory legislative provisions and the loss of Evan's reproductive freedom is really regrettable. The issue is not just the question that the courts focus on, which is that Johnston denied his half of bilateral consent required by the legislation; rather, the deeper rights infringement was that the legislation forced Evans into the position of being solely dependent upon his consent in the first place.
As in the Re R case, sympathy was both openly acknowledged and clearly distrusted throughout the multiple Evans judgments. In the Family Division, Wall J commences his summary of the disputed facts about the decision to generate embryos, "by recording my sympathy for Ms Evans both in relation to her medical condition and to the events of that day" 50 and concludes his assessment of the right to privacy and family life with "I cannot allow my sympathy for Ms Evan's position to outweigh my respect for the scheme which Parliament has put in place". 51 If anything, the judges of the Court of Appeal are more open in acknowledging their emotional responses to the case. The majority judges, Thorpe and Sedley LJJ, preface a number of statements of facts with "sadly" and describe the situation as a "tragedy" for Ms Evans, while Arden LJ's concurring judgment characterises the issues as "emotive" and the experience of infertility as causing "great personal distress". 52 Yet the majority conclude their discussion of the right to privacy and family life with the finding that the "sympathy and concern which anyone must feel for Ms Evans is not enough to render the legislative scheme …disproportionate". 53 The majority in the European Court of Human Rights 54 and the Grand Chamber 55 also expressed "great sympathy" for Evans. Yet in all of the judgments sympathy is swiftly and completely overwhelmed by the discourse of formal equality.
Both Evans and Johnston have a genetic tie to the embryos in dispute, Evans wants a
genetically related child while Johnston does not; this is transformed into an "equal" claim to the embryos involving an equal right to consent to use and an equal right to withdraw consent to use and determine their destruction. 56 The deployment of equality in the judgments is profoundly gender-blind and is informed by a series of completely inapplicable reproductive analogies and reversals that are used to 'prove' how equal the treatment of Evans and Johnston is in law (see Lind 2006 and Sheldon 51 Id at para 260. A postscript to the judgments repeats the expression of sympathy at para 317. 2004). In particular, the judgment in the Family Division deflects Evan's arguments on her right to privacy and family life by framing her claim as one which seeks to "impose" parenthood on Johnston and thrice using a hypothetical reversal of Johnston seeking to "impose" parenthood onto Ms Evans through a forced implantation of the embryo and forced pregnancy. 57 In the most simplistic of syllogisms the obvious unacceptability of coerced pregnancy for women conclusively proves the unacceptability of using embryos without men's consent. 58 The equality implications of this analogy were repeated or referred to with approval on a number of occasions by the appeal courts. 59 Yet as Craig Lind has argued, it is not at all an uncommon experience for men to become parents against their will, nor does this experience necessarily impact upon their lives greatly (Lind 2006; Lind 2003) . Moreover, even in extreme cases of deceit and impaired consent, Sally Sheldon notes the law has itself imposed parental status upon fathers (Sheldon 2001 ). Johnston's position in the case draws on both genetic essentialism and on modes of 'involved' New Fatherhood that are closely connected to 57 Eg. id at para 184 (emphasis added): the right to respect for private life applies equally to both Mr Johnston and Mr Hadley. An unfettered right on the claimant's part to have the embryos transferred into them would, by parity of reasoning, constitute an interference with respect of the men's art 8 rights, in the same way that any attempt on their part to insist that the claimants have the embryos transferred into them against their will would undoubtedly constitute an interference both with the claimants' right to autonomy over their own bodies, and with respect for their private lives. This analogy is repeated at para 251, and extended to include the man having testicular cancer in para 319. 58 The final example was prefaced with the remark that it "is not difficult to reverse the dilemma": id at para 319. In fact, it is extremely difficult to reverse the dilemma given that if Mr Johnston had had cancer he could easily have frozen his semen independently and would not have needed to create embryos. Moreover, Craig Lind notes the legislation required clinics providing any treatment to women to consider the child's "need for a father" but did not have any such requirement to consider mothers if men were seeking treatment (2006) . Further, if embryos were created, 'reversing' the dilemma does not lead inexorably to forced pregnancy; it could include options such as the use of embryos with a new partner, or with a surrogate. fathers' rights discourse. 60 The Family Division holds that Johnston should not be the biological father of a child "with whom [he] could not enjoy any form of natural paternal relationship". 61 (Although, as I argue in Re D, the court could allow him a choice at this later point, and indeed Evan's position was that Johnston could "play as little or as great a role as he wished". 62 In this light, much stress falls on the word "natural"). Implicitly, references in the judgments to the potential child's interests rest on the assumed harm of being raised fatherless. 63 While not in any way endorsing Evans' 'right to life' arguments on behalf of the embryos, 64 I note that the figure of the potential child appears in a deeply paradoxical manner, her imagined welfare demanding only her non-existence.
Commentators on the US embryo dispute cases have noted that the "imposition" on men in these circumstances need not involve either legal or social parenthood (Cahn 2002; Waldman 2004) , and so could be no more than knowing that there is, somewhere in the world, a person genetically connected to them. Naomi Cahn has argued that, 60 'Involvement' for men in parenting may also bear some relation to 'control'. It is interesting that Johnston's recollection of the consent process included the following observation: "I was reassured by the fact that I would still maintain the same control regarding this decision as I would had these unfortunate events not occurred": Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2003] All ER 903 at para 49. 61 Id at para 319. The court also finds that Johnston would be financially liable to support the child and could not be released from this obligation by Evans. Given the findings on the requirement of 'treatment together' to accord paternity in Re R discussed above, this seems erroneous as they would not be treated 'together' at the time of transfer. Alternately, Evans could surely have entered into consent orders for a zero assessment under the Child Support Act 1991 (UK). Amendments before parliament, if passed, make it possible for a man to vary his consent to allow embryo transfer without agreeing to become a legal parent as a consequence, see above note 38. 62 Evans v United Kingdom [2006] 1 FCR 585 (ECtHR) para 52. 63 Alternately, the harm is in being 'unwanted' by her father which, even if it persisted and were made known to her, is still not an uncommon experience. basing the right not to procreate on a fear of having genetically related offspring makes genes the central and defining aspect of the parent-child relationship. This approach misstates the power of genes and biological parenthood and privileges one person's genetic connection over another's (Cahn 2002, 586-587) .
The extremity, the clear falsity and the repetition of the forced pregnancy analogy in the judgments suggest that although the judges are expressing "sympathy" for Evans, it is arguably Johnston with whom they actually empathise. The powerfully emotive example of a forcibly impregnated female body 65 is conjured up for the sole purpose of demonstrating an otherwise invisible, even unintelligible (or at least insignificant in the sense of being both common-place and non-intrusive) harm to men: genetic children they didn't actively choose to have. It is men's position we must feel for here, even if we have to use women's bodies to do it. I claim this is an example of what Henderson labels "unreflective empathy", where decision-makers connect with the position of parties most like their own privileged position without realising or admitting that they are doing so, and therefore replicate patterns of covert discrimination or entrenched inequalities that remain "unseen" by them (Henderson 1987 (Henderson , 1584 (Henderson -1586 (Henderson , 1652 ). This is not to say that empathy is therefore unhelpful, rather it is a caution that -like other forms of reasoning -it can be used in lazy ways.
Henderson argues that "selective" or "unreflective" empathy masks rather than reveals moral choice (1652), and the simplistic embrace of formal equality discourse (facilitated by the use of false analogies) in the Evans judgments bears this out powerfully.
I believe that a reflective use of empathy in this case would help move beyond the binary of forced parenthood/deprivation of children set up in the judgments in which each party's equal and opposite interest in the embryos' use/destruction must balance each other out because of the over-riding 'good' of equality. Empathy should lead us to a far more contextual analysis both of the value of each party's interest or investment in the embryos and of the impact on each of them of their use or destruction. In terms of both interest and impact, Evans' claim is more significant than Johnston's, so she should be able to use the embryos. 66 Consistently with my arguments regarding Re R, if a child resulted, Johnston could then be given a choice as to whether or not he is a legal parent.
Craig Lind notes that Evans' position, like that of Johnston, reflects an "obsession with genetic parenthood" and he contends that judicial and public expressions of sympathy for Evans were "the result of our collective understating of the appropriateness of the desire of all would-be parents to have their own children" (Lind 2006, 586) . Here I support Evan's claim in spite of, rather than because of, genetics. Evans had six viable embryos in storage; she did not have -and would likely have found it very difficult, if not impossible, to engage -both an egg donor and a sperm donor for future conception efforts, 67 even if she could have found a clinic that would treat her in such circumstances. Nor is it likely as a single woman that Evans would be able to adopt a child. Evan's predicament did not rest, then, solely on her desire to have a genetically related child, but rather, like many lesbian mothers, came about as a result of legislation and social policy discriminating against intentionally fatherless families.
Surrogacy
Both commissioning parents and lesbian mothers defy 'naturalness' and displace the primacy of bio-genetic ties in favour of intended relationships in family formation. In the US this resonance between surrogacy and lesbian-led families has been most Like the Rutherford mothers drawing on Trociuk, the Elisa B claim causes me unease as the use of abstract principles about the role of 'intention' drawn from surrogacy case law elides important differences in factual context. Many US surrogacy cases concern disputes between commissioning parents and gestational mothers who have changed their minds about relinquishing the child. "Intention" in these cases, then, is about the unchanged intention of the commissioning parents versus the changed intention of the 'surrogate' or gestational mother. Centring intention in surrogacy disputes may thus mean prioritising pre-conception intention over postbirth intention, and privileging the commissioning parents' intentions over the reproductive labour of the gestational mother. Centring intention in lesbian families to gain recognition of the co-mother from the State for intact lesbian families, or to assert parental status for the co-mother in the context of intra-lesbian disputes about children, is not directly comparable to surrogacy disputes because it does not entail depriving the birth mother of parental status against her wishes.
In lesbian-led families, the closest analogy may be in cases where the intended family was one involving two mothers who are primary carers and an uninvolved (or 'family friend') role for a known sperm donor who changes his mind post-birth and seeks to be an involved parent. An increasing number of such disputes are arising over very young babies, in which case there is little or no pre-existing pattern of contact and the donor's claims rest firmly on biological connection. 71 In these cases, centring preconception intention would exclude the sperm donor from parental status (and from seeking to establish a parental relationship) regardless of his genetic connection to the child. Indeed, Nancy Polikoff has argued that women should be able to enter into binding contracts with known sperm donors to achieve exactly this end (Polikoff 1996; . Yet it is hard to imagine lesbian and feminist scholars arguing in favour of agreements binding surrogate mothers. 72 While it is important to acknowledge that there may be a commonality in the experience between surrogates and donors engaging in the reproductive endeavours of others -such as unexpected love for the child leading to feelings of regret, grief or guilt (see eg. Dempsey 2004, who argues that some gay sperm donors had an experience closer to relinquishment than gamete donation) -a gender-blind analogy fails to take into account the massive differential in reproductive labour between a sperm donor and a gestational mother.
All of this suggests that one must be very careful to be truly fact-sensitive in drawing analogies or extending principles in the context of surrogacy. In particular, the unique position of the gestational mother must be acknowledged, including the value of her reproductive labour, her relationship with the foetus and the importance of her bodily autonomy (Bender 2006) . Even the most basic empathic response tells us that gestational mothers should not be forced by law to relinquish children any more than they should be prevented by law from having abortions (Storrow 2002) . This means privileging the intentions of the gestational mother over other participants by allowing her to change her mind through the pregnancy and for some time afterwards (although both a sense of fairness to the commissioning parents and a best interests approach to the child's attachments would suggest not indefinitely). Privileging the gestational mother's intentions (but not those of a sperm donor) accords with the fundamental values laid out at the opening of this article in that it does not prioritise genetics, applying regardless of whether the commissioning parents or surrogate are 72 For an argument that intent-based or functional parenting recognition for lesbian parents cannot be applied to gay male parents conceiving through surrogacy, see Appleton 2006. genetic parents, 73 and it does value caregiving relationships (in this case to the foetus) again regardless of genetic connection.
These considerations mean that it is vital to distinguish between the legal issues of parentage in surrogacy arrangements where there is no dispute between the participants and those that involve competing claims to parentage and residence of the child when the adults are in dispute. In harmonious surrogacy arrangements the commissioning parents are the social parents of the child but their legal and genetic relationships do not 'match'. One or both may be genetic parents, or neither may be, but in each situation both commissioning parents will likely lack legal status. In many jurisdictions the legal parents of a child born through any form of assisted conception are the gestational mother and her consenting male partner (eg. in Australian states, see Millbank 2006) . A number of cases reveal that commissioning fathers who are also genetic fathers list themselves on the birth certificate regardless of such provisions, 74 and so may be able to 'pass' if their status is unquestioned, whereas the commissioning mother is always excluded. Co-mothers in lesbian-led families are likewise intended and functioning parents who are (largely) unrecognised in law, and so I argue that empathy should lead lesbian mothers to support legal status for commissioning parents in harmonious surrogacy arrangements.
Validating the intended family form and valuing the caring relationship of the commissioning parents could be accomplished by creating a legal regime allowing for 73 Unlike many US cases where the success of the commissioning mother's claim has often hinged on whether or not she is the genetic mother: see Storrow, 2002. legal spouse. 81 A recognition system which truly valued the caregiving relationship of intended parents with the children they raise would not be subject to such limitations.
In situations where gestational mothers and commissioning parents are in conflict, the question of legal status is far more complex than in harmonious arrangements; parental status, parental responsibility, residence and contact may all be in issue between multiple adults, and are all potentially severable. Naomi Cahn has noted in the US context that, " [w] hile courts claim that they can separate the decision on parentage from that on custody, their decisions show that they do not" (Cahn 1991, 1) . In contrast to the US, courts in Britain and Australia have applied the child's best interests test and shown themselves more inclined to fragment the legal components of parenthood in situations such as surrogacy disputes and ART mix-ups (Sheldon 2005b) , where there are multiple contenders for parental status. The sole reported surrogacy dispute in Australian law, Re Evelyn, exemplifies this difference in approach with the court simply side-stepping the issue of legal parentage. In that case, the Full Court of the Family Court noted in a single line that the surrogate mother and commissioning father were the registered parents of the child, did not comment on the fact that this was not in accordance with either state law or the Family Law Act itself (both of which ascribed parental status to the surrogate's husband) 82 and at no stage appeared to consider a declaration as to parentage. While the contentious issue was residence of the child, remarkably the trial court ordered that the commissioning couple and birth parents all share parental responsibility for the long term welfare, care and development of the child -in a very real sense creating four parents -and this part of the decision was not appealed.
The facts of Re Evelyn also contrast with those of many US surrogacy disputes; it was an "altruistic" arrangement between mature adults who were long-term friends, Mrs and Mr S, and Mrs and Mr Q. Mrs S was both the gestational and genetic mother while Mr Q was the genetic father. Mr and Mrs S had three children, while the Qs were infertile as a result of Mrs Q having had ovarian cancer and in the year or two prior to the birth of Evelyn they had adopted a son of Aboriginal descent, Tom. It was the gestational mother, Mrs S, who initiated the arrangement and repeatedly pursued it in the face of ambivalence from the Qs. Perhaps most importantly, Evelyn lived with the Qs for more than six months before Mrs S removed the child from their care and claimed residence. Evelyn was returned to the Qs care through interim orders and stayed with them for a further six months pending trial. By the time of the appeal Evelyn was 18 months old and had lived with the Qs all her life. However the court ordered residence transferred to the Ss, with four days per month contact to the Qs.
Re Evelyn is a distinctly atypical surrogacy dispute because it did not take place until the child had been living with the commissioning parents for a considerable period of time. For that reason I acknowledge that broad conclusions cannot be drawn from it and applied to other surrogacy disputes. In my view, a child's best interests analysis that properly valued stability of attachment under current law should have dictated that Evelyn remain with the Qs. I would also suggest that, consistently with the model for consensual transfer of status discussed above, a time-lag of over six months after having relinquished the child should be enough to vitiate the ability of the gestational mother to change her mind.
Commentators received Evelyn positively because it affirmed the child's best interests principle in surrogacy as in all other child-related disputes, and because it stated that there was no preference in law for biological parents (Otlowski 1999; Stuhmcke 1998 ). Yet the trial decision in Evelyn is extremely problematic in its construction of the "naturalness" of biological family and, while some aspects of the reasoning were criticised by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, the decision was not disturbed on appeal. The trial court held that Evelyn would "find residence in her mother's home as a more natural situation". 83 The judgment also featured a series of passages contrasting the home of Evelyn's biological father with that of her biological mother, such as:
In pure mathematical terms [residing with the Ss] she would have ready access to five of the eight most significant people in her life…I have concluded that, on balance, a child in Evelyn's situation is more likely to cope readily with the prospect of being required to visit the home of her biological father and step-brother from the comfort of the home of her biological mother and two biological sisters and one biological brother, than she would on the alternate outcome. 84 The pre-eminence of biology in this passage is pervasive and un-rationalised. Firstly it is notable that Evelyn's current home is characterised as that of her "biological father" -her social mother and primary caregiver, Mrs Q, is completely absent, and Tom is described erroneously as a "step-brother". 85 A linguistic sleight of hand transforms Evelyn's genetic half-siblings into "biological" siblings, who are moreover assumed to 83 Re Evelyn (1998) FLC 92-807 at 85106. 84 Id at 85105. 85 Tom would be Evelyn's step-brother if he were the biological or adopted child of Mrs Q but not Mr Q, as a step-child is a relation by reason of the marriage of one's parent. Evelyn is the biological child of Mr Q and Tom is his child by adoption, so they are arguably half-siblings.
be among the most important people in her life although she has not yet met them.
The next paragraph continues with the finding that the "loss of the opportunity to be raised with her biological siblings is a greater loss than likely to be occasioned if she is now separated from Tom" and is followed by repeated declarations that the relationship of biological siblings is "special" and "cannot be replicated" by adopted siblings. 86 Mrs S offers biological connection -and lots of it, more than the Qs ever can (because they are, after all, infertile).
The Qs are here placed in a position similar to that of a lesbian co-mother in intra-lesbian disputes over children, where their history of care for the child evaporates in the face of the biological mother's position as the "natural" parent. The reference to "mathematical terms" in deciding the importance of Evelyn's future family relationships echoes a passage of the judgment of the House of Lords in the English intra-lesbian case of Re G which suggested that a biological mother is always 'more' of a mother than a social parent can be. In Re G the court accepted that parents in nontraditional families may be genetic, gestational or social/psychological, but went on to characterise the birth mother as "the natural mother of these children in every sense of that term" 87 and "both their biological and their psychological parent" 88 , while the co-mother, like an adoptive parent, could only ever be a psychological parent. In a recent critique of Re G, Alison Diduck argues that biological connectedness is seen as such an unquestioned good that it is not a factor additional to a child's best interest or welfare inquiry but is rather fused with it. Diduck states, "Biological relationships … take priority, in the name of welfare, over social ones" (Diduck, 2007 , emphasis in original) -a remark equally applicable to the court's approach in Re Evelyn.
There are also a number of resonances between Re Evelyn and lesbian mother versus donor disputes. In Re Evelyn the trial court came to the empathic conclusion that "Evelyn will suffer problems relating to issues such as abandonment and identity during her adolescence" 89 (and held that her biological mother would be most able to help her through these hypothetical problems). This conclusion was based on the evidence of experts for the Ss, whose views were drawn from adoption literature. 90 A great deal of literature on adopted children, like that of children conceived through donor gametes, is based on the experiences of people who were not told about their origins as children and so experienced feelings of shock, deception or betrayal by their parents when they found out later in life (McNair 2004, 39-45; Haimes 1998 90 The Qs attacked the validity of such comparisons on appeal, leading the Full Court to note that in fact one of the experts had drawn his views more from foster care (85107), arguably an even less appropriate analogy.
long-running sperm donor versus lesbian mother case of P v K in New Zealand, 91 the court relied upon child development research regarding the benefits of an on-going relationship with biological parents drawn from a completely different context (separated heterosexual families) to support a finding which superimposed a biological father onto an intact functioning lesbian family. In such instances it seems that the (mis)use of research may be a pretext for the projection of 'commonsense' notions that seek to recreate genetic families in the face of contradictory experience.
Another issue in Re Evelyn was the Qs' attitude to contact. The Ss proposed liberal contact with the Qs should they have residence, whereas the Qs "expressed reservations" about contact between the Ss and Evelyn should Evelyn live with them. 92 In a 'pro-contact' family law culture which places great emphasis on biological relationships, the Ss' attitude to contact bolstered their claim, while the Qs' attitude harmed theirs. Yet the Qs' concern that it would be undermining for Tom's sense of stability and attachment to see his sister treated differently to him based on genetics (especially given that it seems he was the only non-white member of the family), was never seriously entertained. The Qs felt that extensive contact threatened them as a family unit, whereas the court characterised contact as simply maintaining Evelyn's family relationships. 93 The Qs' concerns about an absent biological parent undermining their sense of family are strongly resonant of lesbian-led families' disputes with biological fathers. Lesbian mothers have at times opposed contact between sperm donors and children on the basis that his self-concept as a 'father' was undermining their family unit, confusing to the child, and necessitated unequal treatment of siblings based on genetic links when families were formed with different donors. 94 Courts have been overwhelmingly dismissive of such concerns, have 'naturalised' the role of donors as fathers and have characterised biological fathers as inevitably adding to rather than intruding on or undermining lesbian family units (Millbank 2008b ).
While in lesbian mother versus sperm donor cases, fathers' rights discourses and genetic essentialism flow seamlessly into one another to transform the role of biological fathers from gamete donors into bedrock social relationships of unquestioned benefit to children, Re Evelyn shows that genetic essentialism does not always benefit fathers. Ideas of genetic truth and the importance of genetic relationships to children do not stand alone; rather they are played out in the midst of other pre-existing conceptions of gender roles and family forms, which will sometimes reinforce and other times cut across them. For example, the modern context of family law in which a 'normal' father-child relationship commonly entails a non-resident father, may make the decisions in Evelyn and in P v K seem more like the maintenance of a 'normal' cultural status quo to courts (biological or 'natural' fathers being granted beneficial contact with their children) rather than a dramatic breach and judicial refashioning of established relationships for the non-traditional families in question. These case studies highlight the competing place of social and genetic parenthood. By and large the decisions document the pervasiveness of biological understandings of family and illustrate a powerful contemporary trend in family law to transpose ideas of 'genetic truth' into actual social relationships. In Evans, the coalescence between the imposed 'need' for fathers in reproductive technology regulation with assumptions that any genetic connection is actually parenthood utterly thwarted Natalie Evans' parental aspirations. In Re Evelyn the court assumed that separation from a biological mother was akin to the 'abandonment' of adoption and would cause long-term problems for a baby, while separation from her social mother/primary caregiver was viewed as less significant. These cases evidence Alison Diduck's argument that there has been a "shift in the relative importance of biological relationships over social ones" in family law in which genetic 'truth' has been enmeshed with both the discourse of children's welfare and that of children's rights (Diduck 2007) . In Re. R, the court was confounded by the paradox of a willing (yet non-consenting) father who had no genetic link to the child. Although denied parental status, Mr B was nonetheless characterised as a holder of 'genetic truth' in the face of the mother's deceit surrounding conception, and he was granted indirect contact to ensure, among other things, that the child was informed of her "unusual biological background" and helped to "come to terms with her origins". 95 Unlike most family law determinations, the cases under discussion here concern families formed by intention rather than by genetics alone. In addition, the cases all involve parties with parental claims who are not in relationships with each other or living in common households, and all concern very young children or embryos. Judges looking to, or for, ideas of 'traditional' family relationships in this context is mere fantasy. Reflective empathy may play an important role in such disputes, drawing attention to whose position is identified with and opening a more thoroughgoing investigation into what interests are valued, and why they are valued.
Empathy may not provide 'the answer', but it should generate more nuanced questions that are pursued in a context-sensitive rather than abstract fashion. Being mindful of empathy in an evaluative inquiry may also take us beyond the oppositional binaries that adversarial dispute resolution so often engenders. In the Evans and Re. R cases in particular, I argue that empathy should take us behind the parties' individual positions in the dispute to ask how those positions were first moulded by social and legal conditions, and urge us to seek more creative resolution. In Re Evelyn I find strong resonances with the position of a heterosexual commissioning couple in a surrogacy arrangement and the experiences of lesbian families.
Cultural narratives of genetic essentialism are in the ascendant and I suggest that this augers very ill for non-biological families formed with the use of donor gametes. In this light it may well be important for 'reproductive outsiders' of all kinds to recognise and draw on their commonalities, while being respectful too of differences, in order to work for a legal regime that can fully accommodate both their parental aspirations and functional parent-child relationships.
